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Strategic Agility Explanations for Managing Franchising Expansion  
During Economic Cycles 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Sustained economic growth is one of the key imperatives for an agile venture. Franchising is a 
hybrid form of business that includes both market- and firm-like characteristics, embodying 
some rigidity due to routines, standardization, and replication. However, by shifting resources 
between company-owned and franchising modalities franchising firms may also exhibit strategic 
agility through resource fluidity. An agile franchisor can manage system expansion during the 
economic cycle by shifting its resources. An analysis of a balanced comprehensive database of 
151 U.S. hybrid franchising organizations, including observations for the years between 2001 
and 2008 and using two time-series analytic approaches under varying economic conditions, 
reveals a curvilinear U-shaped relationship between the economic cycle and franchising 
expansion. Executives of franchising firms can create and sustain strategic agility as economic 
conditions change. 
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1 Introduction 
The increase in academic research on franchising corresponds with its worldwide growth 
(Bürkle and Posselt, 2008; Combs, Michael, and Castrogiovanni, 2004; Combs et al., 2011; 
Hendrikse, Hippman, and Windpserger, 2015; Lafontaine, 1992; Windsperger and Dant, 2006). 
Given its economic importance, scholars in several disciplines have been trying to understand 
why firms franchise. The field of finance views franchising as a form of capital, whereby the 
franchisor uses franchisees’ equity to grow its franchising network (Carney and Gedajlovic, 
1991). In entrepreneurship, franchising is a business form when one type of entrepreneur 
(franchisor) contractually permits another type of entrepreneurs (franchisees) provide equity to 
invest in his/her venture (franchising firm). There are two dominant theories (resource scarcity 
and agency theory) that have been heavily used to explain the reasons for franchising and the 
proportion of franchised units to total units. Although more recent explanations, such as 
institutional theory (Barthélemy, 2011; Combs, Michael and Castrogiovanni, 2009) and 
resource-based theory (Gillis, Combs, and Ketchen, 2014) have emerged, all these theoretical 
explanations suffer from a common shortcoming. That is, these theoretical arguments fail to 
consider how the external macroeconomic environment influences the use of franchising. 
Therefore, there exists a need to look at how environmental business conditions shape up the 
strategic entrepreneurship of franchising firms. That is, the strategic response of franchising 
firms to changing economic conditions is expected to offer a better explanation of why 
franchising stood the test of time and serves as one of the primary examples of enduring 
entrepreneurship.  
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This study aims to demonstrate how franchising firms were are able to withstand varying 
macroeconomic conditions and continued to grow. We use strategic agility as a theoretical 
framework to explain our phenomenon.  Strategic agility is defined as "the ability to 
continuously adjust and adapt strategic direction in the core business, as a function of strategic 
ambitions and changing circumstances” (Doz and Kosonen, 2008a, 2008b).  Acting and thinking 
with agility should help ventures improve their performance and, possibly, increase their 
likelihood of survival.  Both proactive planning and strategic responses to economic fluctuations 
are underlying characteristics of strategic agility.  In this article, we focus on the impact of the 
business cycle on resource fluidity, one of the three key meta-capabilities in agility theory. 
“Strategic discontinuities and disruptions usually call for changes in the business model. 
But, over time, efficient firms naturally evolve business models of increasing stability—and 
therefore rigidity” (Doz and Kosonen, 2010). Growing ventures also seek stability, resulting in 
the pursuit of both efficiency and predictability, which, in some cases, may lead to rigidity.  
Additionally, one of the main purposes of a venture business strategy is to consider how to 
manage interactions with the environment.  Companies pursuing a growth strategy are generally 
more vulnerable to environmental changes, especially when there is a downturn in the economy, 
and thus their business models need to encompass both agility and flexibility (Doz and Kosonen, 
2010). 
This study makes several contributions to the extant body of knowledge. First, we 
provide a novel explanation as to why franchisors choose to grow via different strategies as 
business conditions change. In essence, we demonstrate that franchisors have opportunity to 
behave entrepreneurially by opening their own units and/or select other entrepreneurs (i.e., 
franchisees) as partners by using their knowledge and capital depending on the macroeconomic 
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environment. Second, our results, can potentially serve as an explanation for when franchisee 
capital is more attractive (Gonzales-Diaz and Rodriguez, 2012). Last, we show that strategic 
agility provides additional insights into how and why some business models are more successful 
than others. 
2 Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1. Theoretical explanations of franchising 
There are two dominant theories of franchising— resource-scarcity theory and agency 
theory—as well as several newly emerging theories of franchising.  The two main theories are 
primarily static and utilize internal variables to explain franchising (e.g., age, size, royalties, 
franchising fees, and the amount of investment). The degree of franchising is determined by the 
life-cycle of the franchisor while the external environment is largely held constant. Both of these 
theories assume that firms will reach a steady state in terms of their proportion of franchising. 
Other theories are unable to predict how franchising will change in response to environmental 
changes.  Table 1 below summarizes the major franchising theories.   
Insert Table 1 Here 
Given the rigidity of existing theories and the general paucity of theorizing regarding 
franchising, Gillis and Castrogiovanni (2012) suggest that future researchers should (1) expand 
the diversity of franchising theories, (2) employ large-scale and longitudinal data, and (3) 
challenge the implicit assumptions of the agency and resource-scarcity theories.  Following these 
suggestions, this article highlights the weaknesses of current theories of franchising and proposes 
agility theory as a dynamic alternative to complement the existing theoretical literature.  Agility 
theory is then tested using large-scale longitudinal data in an attempt to explain why franchisors 
may situate both franchising and company-owned units in the same location (this cannot be 
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explained by agency theory) and why franchising companies ultimately do not necessarily 
become wholly-owned (as is assumed by resource-scarcity theory). 
Given that the strength of franchising is its ability to standardize operations and replicate 
successful routines (Winter et al., 2012), how does a hybrid franchising organization display 
strategic agility?  This leads to the franchising-agility paradox—franchising depends on 
standardization of the business format to expand a “proven” business system, but this very same 
system creates rigidity that limits the firm’s ability to change.  Thus there are two conflicting 
demands (Pache and Santos, 2010). Agility in hybrid franchising organizations is manifested by 
the firm’s ability to control the proportion of ownership, thereby to adjust capital-risk exposure 
to economic fluctuations and to achieve synergies between the two business forms. An agile 
hybrid franchisor can respond to the changing environment through resource fluidity, and 
shifting between internally-generated and externally-generated financing growth.  Hybrid 
franchising organizations seek growth by expanding the system either by operating company-
owned units or by selling distribution rights to a third party (i.e., the franchisee).  In either case, a 
fairly rigid business formula is followed in order to maintain system quality and brand-image 
consistency.   
This study focuses on an observable and testable pillar of strategic agility—resource 
fluidity—to support the agility theory of franchising.  Agility theory consists of three meta- 
capabilities: strategic sensitivity, leadership unity, and resource fluidity.  According to Doz 
(2011),  strategic sensitivity refers to seeing and framing opportunities and threats in new 
insightful ways; leadership unity involves making difficult collective decisions that are put in 
place and implemented; and resource fluidity refers to rapid and efficient mobilization of 
resources. We focus on the resource fluidity of agility not only because of its more “observable” 
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nature but also due to its prominence as an outcome-based measure. It is more difficult to 
observe leadership capabilities, top team collaboration, mutual dependency, or strategic 
sensitivity via high-quality internal dialogues, strategic awareness, or experimentation. It may 
also be argued that without the other two meta- capabilities, resource fluidity is less likely to take 
place.  Resource redeployment is an outcome of a shared managerial vision, sensitivity to 
changes in the environment, and a willingness to take collective action.  We further contend that 
because there are switching costs between the two modalities of expansion (franchising and 
company ownership) and a U-shaped relationship exists between economic growth and 
franchising expansion. 
2.2. Explanations of franchising and agility theory 
In franchising, in order to finance growth there is a substitution between two types of 
“capital” resources (i.e., internally-financed company-owned growth and externally-financed 
franchise growth). Norton (1995) suggests that franchisees provide a source of competitive 
capital to franchisors who, in turn, are able to grow more quickly. Resource redeployment in 
franchising has been studied extensively in the franchising literature as it relates to the 
redirection of ownership, particularly in the U.S. context, with the two leading theories (agency 
and resource-scarcity) dominating the available explanations.   
In the past three decades several theories, in particular agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and resource-scarcity theory (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1969), have been employed 
to explain why firms engage in franchising. These theories have been tested extensively by 
numerous scholars (Alon, 2001: Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991; Combs and Castrogiovanni, 1994; 
Combs and Ketchen, 1999, 2003; Dnes, 1996; Elango and Fried, 1997; Lafontaine and Slade, 
1997; Pizanti and Lerner, 2003).  In these theories, franchising is viewed as a potentially useful 
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strategy to pursue growth (Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991).  For example, a recent study in 
entrepreneurship by Gonzalez-Diaz and Solis-Rodriguez, 2012 uses informativeness principle of 
the principal-agent problem to add to this line of inquiry by investigating when the capital 
supplied by franchisees becomes attractive to franchisors. 
Other emerging theories applied to franchising (reviewed in Table 1) include institutional 
theory (Combs et al., 2009), search cost theory (Minkler, 1992), and signalling theory (Gallini 
and Lutz, 1992.).  What is common among these theories is that they are primarily internally-
oriented, and they have few links to the external environment. To date, there has been little 
research on how environmental factors such as the business cycle affect franchising. 
Agility theory complements the dominant approaches, thus overcoming some of the 
limitations of the earlier theories.  It provides a building block to understand when and why firms 
adopt franchising by accounting for the effects of the macroeconomic conditions. That is, 
strategic agility considers not only internal organizational factors but also external economic 
conditions.  It can potentially explain how franchisors may have hybrid organizations in the same 
location and also suggests that optimal franchising may change over time depending on the 
economic cycle and changes in the business environment.   
 2.3.The agility theory of franchising 
A theoretical framework that offers a more complete explanation for why firms franchise 
is the theory of strategic agility (Doz and Kosonen, 2008a).  More specifically, the unique 
influence of economic conditions requires that franchising firms become strategically agile (Doz 
and Kosonen, 2008a).  This suggests that successful firms are those whose business models 
evolve in the direction of increasing stability. When a firm’s resources are scarce, because, for 
example, of an economic recession, it may seek to grow by franchising.  When domestic markets 
are saturated, it may seek international franchisees to supplement its growth.  This is because 
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strategic firms look toward the future, make long-term and firm commitments, and employ a 
dedicated leadership that will allocate precious resources to meet their commitments (Doz and 
Kosonen, 2008a). However, successful firms should also be able to shift and change rapidly (i.e., 
be agile). Agility requires that firms remain flexible, constantly re-evaluating past decisions and 
always ready to take actions as conditions in the business environment change (Doz and 
Kosonen, 2008a).  
Strategic agility consists of three pillars.  These are called “meta-capabilities” (namely, 
strategic sensitivity, resource fluidity, and leadership unity) (Doz and Kosonen, 2008a) . These 
meta-capabilities are portfolios of core competencies based on the tenets of resource-based 
theory (Penrose, 1959) and dynamic-capabilities theory (Teece et al., 1997).  That is, these meta-
capabilities allow a firm to use its organizational capabilities to achieve a competitive advantage 
in rapidly changing environments.  
Agility theory is a phenotype and an outgrowth of resource-based abilities, which can be 
regarded as genotypes.  Phenotypes allow for observation of the company characteristics as a 
result of its interaction with the environment, whereas genotypes are the distinguishing DNA of 
the organization.  Strategic agility has a high degree of commonality with its organizational 
capabilities genotype. Although organizational-capabilities theory has grown out of resource-
based theory, the former distinguishes between resources and capabilities (Teece et al., 1997).  
Resources may be transferred, but capabilities are specific to the firm.  
Resource fluidity is perhaps one of the most discussed and most important pillars of 
strategic agility partly because the other two meta- capabilities potentially can be regarded as 
determinants of resource fluidity. In other words, a given firm needs to possess strategic 
sensitivity and display a collective commitment (leadership unity) in order to reach a decision to 
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reconfigure its capabilities and redeploy its resources (i.e., to achieve resource fluidity). The 
redeployment of resources can be viewed as the reactive aspect of resource fluidity because in 
the case of franchisors these firms are reacting to the changing economic conditions. Hence, the 
franchising agility paradox can be solved by understanding resource fluidity. 
2.4.Agility theory of franchising and economic fluctuations 
When economic conditions are favorable, hybrid organizations may elect to open more 
company-owned units since it may be easier to secure financing and the risk levels of future cash 
flows may be low. However, against the background of negative economic conditions, hybrid 
firms will need to manage risks and thus will seek growth primarily through franchising. Martin 
and Justis (1993) find that firms use more franchising when interest rates increase the cost of 
capital. In the same vein, Gonzalez-Diaz and Solis-Rodriguez (2012) report that franchisor resort 
to opening more company-owned units when cost of capital is low. There is also a common 
belief that franchising may boom during periods of economic recessions (Hall and Dixon, 1989). 
This belief stems from the fact that some individuals who became unemployed during a 
recession may enter franchising as an alternative to self-employment (Frazer et al., 2007). 
In the case of franchising firms, the reactive aspect of resource fluidity (e.g., redeploying 
capital and managerial talent) is achieved by switching between the two business models to 
achieve growth. That is, hybrid organizations elect to grow through franchising when capital and 
human resources are scarce. However, when the costs of access to capital are low and when 
managerial talent is abundant, franchisors will generate profits through both company-owned 
units and franchising. Resource fluidity in franchising is based on several factors. First, 
franchising firms can adjust downward the proportion of franchised units in a network by no 
longer offering franchising opportunities, closing units, refusing to renew franchise contracts, 
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taking over franchised operations, or launching new company-owned units. In contrast, 
franchisors can increase the proportion of franchised units by recruiting new franchisees or by 
selling their company-owned units to franchisees. Franchisors can then in turn use these proceeds 
to open additional company-owned units in locations with high business potential. By shifting 
resources, franchising firms have the unique ability to pursue strategic agility and stable business 
growth, irrespective of the economic conditions. That is, during both economic recessions and 
during boom periods firms will rely on franchisees that presumably have better local expertise 
and will help the franchisors develop shorter “time-to-market” reactions to the changing 
economic realities.   
The agility of franchisors may be demonstrated by the following example. When 
economic forecasts are pessimistic, then franchising firms can be proactive by attempting to 
grow via multi-outlet franchising agreements. By engaging in multi-outlet franchising, they are 
able to cut franchisee-recruiting and selection costs. Franchising firms, which do not invest in 
company-based expansion during turbulent economic times, may still be able to reap returns via 
royalties and franchisee fees from a growing family of franchisees. But when economic forecasts 
are optimistic, then franchising firms are able to both recruit franchisees and to open company-
owned units.   
Strategic-agility theory suggests that in order to survive and prosper firms need to be 
proactive with respect to changing their strategies.  As the business cycle challenges the business 
fundamentals, hybrid companies are able to shift toward relatively more franchising.  Companies 
must quickly change their future growth expectations to and from franchising based on whether 
the economy is expanding or contracting. Therefore, during economic downturns, although 
others may lose their market share, an agile franchisor may be able to gain market share by 
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engaging in more franchising, even if at the cost of forgoing the full profit potential of the 
business.  
The business cycle (or fluctuations in the macroeconomic environment) has an impact on all 
forms of business growth, but it has a unique impact on hybrid organizations. As noted, 
franchising is a substitute for capital expansion: by allowing others to make financial 
investments in the system, the franchisor uses the franchisees as investors to make use of the 
franchisor’s intangible assets.  
Franchising firms, like other hybrid organizations (Battilana and Dorado, 2010), face 
economic or legal switching costs (also called adjustment costs) when they convert their 
company-owned units to franchised units or when they buy back franchised units (Combs et al., 
2009).   Furthermore, internal inertia and the type of industry may also have an effect on the 
switching between company-owned and franchised units (Combs et al., 2009). However, existing 
research shows that franchising firms are able to minimize the switching costs by quickly 
adjusting their target proportion of franchised units due to their ability to open new franchised 
units or to redirect ownership (Gonzalez-Diaz and Solis-Rodriguez, 2012).  
The unique organizational form embodied in franchising suggests that the macroeconomic 
environment has a U-shaped impact on franchising. We base our U-shaped hypothesis on a 
combination of agility theory and the dominant paradigms (the resource-scarcity and agency 
theories). That is, during a negative business cycle, capital resources are scarce so companies 
will rely on franchising as their main growth strategy. Also, under adverse economic conditions, 
companies will prefer to franchise in order to reduce the risks associated with undertaking 
additional investments.  Conversely, as an economy begins to recover and economic growth 
turns positive, profit potentials and resources also increase, giving rise to an expansion of 
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company-owned units.  Since investment risks then decrease, companies will be more willing to 
provide their own capital. A growth-oriented economy will positively affect the profitability of 
all businesses, including company-owned units and franchised units.  In the franchising sector, if 
the economy is growing, franchisors can increase the number of franchisees as well as the 
number of company-owned units.  According to agency theory, a franchisor’s decision to use one 
system of expansion over another depends on his/her ability to monitor units. During highly 
positive growth periods capital resources and liquidity will shift to remote, rural, and distant 
locations. Thus franchisors with available capital and an effective business model may prefer to 
own units that they can monitor and control and to franchise remote units that are difficult for 
them to monitor.   
Inconsistencies regarding the impacts of capital scarcity, growth rates, the size of the 
system, and age on the use of franchising may be partially resolved by looking beyond simple 
linear relationships.  Castrogiovanni et al. (2006), for example, find that there exists a cubic 
pattern whereby franchisors undergo three stages, first increasing franchising, then decreasing 
franchising, and, then again increasing franchising.  Shane (1998) finds a curvilinear 
relationship, an inverse U-shape, between system size and franchising. Curvilinear relationships 
provide a richer explanation and insights into the inconsistent linear relations that are found by 
sampling firms at various stages of development and under differing economic conditions.   
We have explained how hybrid organizations use franchising both in times of economic 
prosperity, when capital is abundant, and during periods of economic recession.  A U-shaped 
impact of franchising growth is likely to occur when firms incur switching costs as they redeploy 
resources from plural form expansions to franchising approaches.  There are several types of 
switching costs.  As a firm moves from franchising to a company-owned outlet, it must expand 
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its resources to directly manage the firm.  Agency costs may also increase due to the need for 
monitoring.  During economic recessions, franchisors may redeploy resources to seek more 
franchisees. Also during such periods, significant franchise-relationship transaction costs may 
increase, for example, due to the need for additional legal services or due to the increased 
pressures to manage a larger franchise system.  Because of the switching costs, we expect to see 
a lull in franchising development during an economic transition, that is, the period of resource 
fluidity. In sum, resources cannot be entirely adapted to alternative uses.  The resultant 
relationship between economic growth and franchising is thus expected to be curvilinear which 
leads to our core hypothesis: 
H1. There is a non-linear (U-shaped) relationship between economic growth and franchising 
such that growth through franchising will first decrease and then will increase based on the state 
of the economy. 
 
3 Methodology 
We tested our hypotheses on economic growth by analyzing a large dataset and by using 
several case firms to support our theoretical argument. Firm data comes from Bond’s Guide 
which is commonly used in franchising studies and is believed to adequately represent the 
population of U.S. franchising firms (Azoulay and Shane, 2001; Scott, 1995). To increase the 
robustness of our findings we utilized two samples.  The main dataset was a balanced panel 
database of 151 companies with eight observations for the years between 2001 and 2008.  For 
robustness checks we utilized an unbalanced sample of 1,999 firms for the years between 1993 
and 2008, resulting in 10,001 observations. The second dataset had an average of 5 observations 
per company, ranging from 1 to 14 observations. We also tested our models with and without 
                                 
14 
 
industry controls; these tests produced similar results. To supplement our analysis, we researched 
a number of specific case studies during an economic cycle and observed their franchising 
expansion.  By supplementing the quantitative analysis with qualitative research, we were able to 
provide stronger support for agility theory.   
 
3.1. Dependent variable 
Using U.S.-based companies, our sample was based on Bond’s Guide for Franchise 
Opportunities from 1993 to 2008.  Our dependent variable was the number of expected 
franchising units. It was based on Bond’s Guide questionnaire, which asks the number of new 
franchising units the company was planning to open within the next twelve months. This 
measure is superior to previous measures that have been used, such as the proportion of 
franchising, because it is more forward-looking, reflecting managerial plans during the time they 
are assessing the environment.   
3.2. Independent variables 
Our key independent variable is macroeconomic business cycles. We used five different 
measures to capture the business cycle during the same year as the planning for the new 
franchising units. The description of the variables and their respective hypothesized signs are 
shown in Table 2. The business-cycle variables are Gross Domestic Production (GDP) growth 
(annual percentage), GDP per capita growth (annual percentage), GNI growth (annual 
percentage), GNI per capita growth (annual percentage), and the unemployment rate (annual 
percentage).  Based on the survey and the previous literature we also included variables to 
control for the resource-scarcity and agency theories of franchising. 
Insert Table 2 Here 
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Data for five independent variables to measure the state of the economy were obtained 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) provided by the World Bank database. Data for 
all the control variables came from Bond’s Guide for Franchise Opportunities and were specific 
to each company. These variables are considered to be correlated with franchising growth and 
they are also proxies for the other two theories of franchising (agency and resource-scarcity). By 
using control variables representing the two most established franchising theories, we show the 
unique effects of strategic agility on franchising.  
3.3. Control variables 
We use four control variables which are commonly employed to test resource scarcity and 
agency explanations of franchising. Year founded and firm size are controls for resource 
scarcity. FOUNDED is year in which a firm was founded which is an inverse of firm age (Alon, 
2001). Firm size (SIZE) is number of franchised units. We use franchised units instead of total 
units (Alon, 2001) because our dependent variable is number of expected franchised units.  
Geographic dispersion is one of the most long-standing measures under agency theory 
explanations for franchising. It is measured as number of states (STATES) (Combs and Ketchen, 
1999). The last control variable under agency theory is average outlet startup costs (STARTUP) 
(Alon, 2001). 
 
4 Analyses and Results 
 4.1.Empirical findings 
As can be seen in Table 3, firms in our sample had a mean of 67 projected units. The 
average founding year was 1974 and the mean for number of franchised units was 644. Table 3 
also shows bivariate correlations for independent and control variables. It should be noted that 
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correlations for count data (number of projected franchised units) are not relevant and thus not 
reported. While some of the control variables are significantly correlated with each other, those 
correlations are not strong enough to raise multicollinearity concerns. All economic variables 
except unemployment are highly correlated with each other. However, this again does not raise 
multicollinearity issues, since we use each of these economic measures in separate equations.  
Insert Table 3 Here 
   Since our outcome variable is count data (i.e., number of expected franchised units), we 
are using Count Model panel data with a Poisson distribution. As a robustness check we employ 
GLS regression with panel data.  Additionally, we ran fixed firm effects model to control for 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. In all cases, we find support for the resource fluidity meta-
capability of agility theory in our tested empirical models of franchising.  The U-shaped effect of 
the business/economic cycle on franchising is also strongly supported. In both datasets and in the 
five ways we calculated the business cycle we obtained a consistently significant U-shaped 
impact of the economic variables on franchising, therefore increasing our confidence regarding 
strategic agility. Table 4 presents the results for the main dataset using Count Model panel data 
with a Poisson distribution.  
Insert Table 4 Here 
In the first instance, there is a negative linear relationship between GDP-Growth and 
expected franchising. This provides partial support for the idea that franchising is less used 
during periods of economic boom, as one will attempt to capture more profits from ownership.  
The quadratic term of GDP-Growth is positively related to expected franchising. This implies 
that franchisors will resort to franchising during economic downturns. Therefore, these results 
lend support for our key hypothesis (H1). The U-shape is also supported when GDPPC-Growth 
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is used as a proxy for the economic environment. That is, GDPPC-Growth has the same impact 
on franchising as GDP-Growth. Last, GNI-Growth has a negative relationship with franchising, 
whereas the quadratic term of GNI-Growth has a positive relationship with franchising. As a 
consequence, we again find support for H1. 
An additional strong signal supporting the U-shaped effect is revealed when 
unemployment is used as a proxy for the business cycle; however, in this case, we observe an 
inverse U-shaped effect. This is due to the fact that unemployment is negatively correlated with 
GDP-Growth, GDPPC-Growth, and GNI-Growth.  When growth is low, unemployment is high, 
and vice versa.  
Among the control variables embodying agency and resource scarcity, FOUNDED has a 
negative effect on franchising growth. This means that the older the franchisor, the more likely it 
is that the firm will prefer to grow via franchising. As for STATES, firms that have a presence in 
more states are less likely to franchise. The last control variable, STARTUP, has a negative 
effect on franchising, meaning that when the start-up costs to open a unit are higher, there is less 
of a likelihood that a firm will franchise its future units. We conducted a robustness check and 
we also obtained the same results when using GLS panel data.  In addition, we re-ran our model 
by excluding quick-service restaurants because when discretionary income decreases during 
recessions, individuals may scale down on eating out and may prefer to visit quick-service 
restaurants over full-service restaurants. Our sample includes some franchisors which have 
domestic operations and these firms may have limited growth opportunities in recessions relative 
to international franchisors. To ensure that our results are not driven by international franchising 
we created a control variable where international franchisors were coded as 1, and domestic were 
coded as 0. We also replaced FOUNDED with franchising experience (number of years 
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franchising). We also included a variable to control for industry size (number of outlets in an 
industry). This is because mature industries with more outlets may have lower growth 
opportunities. In all cases, our results did not change as all independent variables were 
significant and had the same directional signs as in our main model.   
The next step in our analysis includes the visual representation of our model. From the panel 
regression coefficients (presented in Table 4), we can calculate the incident rate ratios (IRR), 
allowing us to display the percentage change of expected new franchised units. Figure 1 presents 
the results for the IRR of GDPPC-Growth (annual percentage). The IRR for GDPPC-Growth is 
0.969, and the IRR for GDPPC-Growth2 is 1.02. This means that for each unit increase in 
GDPPC-Growth, the dependent variable will decrease by 3.1 percent and for each unit increase 
in GDPPC-Growth2, the dependent variable will increase by 2 percent. 
In Figure 1 we display the results for GDPPC-Growth between -1 percent and 4 percent. 
This is the range that represents U.S. GDPPC-Growth in the sampled years.  The figure provides 
a graphic illustration of our significant results: During a negative business cycle with negative 
GDPPC-Growth, the expected number of franchising units increases. When the economy begins 
to grow and creates moderate positive GDPPC-Growth, the expected number of franchising units 
decreases. Finally, when GDPPC-Growth is high (above 1.6 percent), the expected number of 
franchising units will once again increase. When the economy is growing between 0 and 1.6 
percent, we estimate the switching costs to be the highest. At this moderate level of economic 
growth franchisors expect the smallest increase in franchising; they either gear up for more 
company and franchising growth as the economic conditions improve and when economic 
prospects are declining they expand their franchising offerings both domestically and 
internationally. 
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Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
4.2. Exemplar firms illustrating the impacts of economic fluctuations on franchising 
Several cases illustrate how the U-shaped impact is created in franchising companies.  
The case of Checkers Drive-in Restaurants (hereafter Checkers), one firm in our empirical 
database, provides evidence for the U-shaped argument. During the 2001 recession, Checkers 
opened or reopened thirteen units. Since access to capital is difficult and investments are risky 
during periods of economic recessions, Checkers decided to franchise twelve of these new 
restaurants and to open only one company-owned outlet.  However, when economic growth 
moderated, Checkers opened both franchises and company-owned units. For example, in 1996 
Checkers opened five new company-owned restaurants and re-acquired eighteen restaurants from 
franchisees, making a total of twenty-three company-owned units. In the same year, franchisees 
opened twenty-five units and acquired fifteen units from Checkers, resulting in forty franchised 
units. 
 The above example clearly indicates that over time Checkers engaged in an active 
rebalancing of its portfolio of company-owned and franchised units. In its annual report it is 
stated that its “growth strategy … is to focus on the controlled development of additional 
franchised and company-operated restaurants primarily in our existing core markets and to 
further penetrate markets currently under development by franchisees…” (Checkers Drive-In 
Restaurants, 2004).  
A second case supporting our U-shaped firm growth argument comes from the UK-based 
frozen foods retailer Cook. Cook began franchising in 2009, a period of negative economic 
growth. The company reported that the response by prospective franchisees was very positive 
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and that the company hoped to franchise three stores in 2009 and eight more in 2010 (Brooks, 
2009). Co-founder Edward Perry stated: “The recession was a ‘great time’ to franchise. There are 
plenty of high caliber people with redundancy checks … (Brooks, 2009).  However, in 2012 a 
Cook spokesman noted that growth via company-owned stores would be central for the next 
three years (Montague-Jones, 2012). As the next three years (2013 through 2015) were expected 
to bring moderate economic growth, Cook’s strategy was consistent with Figure 1 where firms 
tend to engage in less franchising during periods of economic growth. Another case that supports 
franchising during recessionary periods is that of the Red Mango frozen yoghurt company, which 
was planning to open forty units in 2009, most of which would be franchised.  
The above examples show that a firm’s growth strategy is influenced by the future 
economic outlook. That is, during periods when GNP growth is slowing down and capital is both 
scarce and risky, a firm tends to pursue growth via franchising. However, when the economy is 
growing at a moderate pace a firm may resort to opening more company-owned units or it may 
re-acquire existing units from franchisees. 
5 Managerial and Theoretical Implications 
 Based on the resource-fluidity capability in the strategic-agility theory, this article presents a 
thorough explanation of why and when firms franchise under dynamic conditions of economic 
fluctuation. Although we agree that the resource-scarcity and agency theories provide partial 
explanations for why firms franchise, we contend that strategic-agility theory adds an important 
building block to explain franchising. We found a U-shaped effect of the local environment on 
the opening of new franchised units. The explanation for this U-shaped relationship is consistent 
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with the strategic-agility argument, thereby enhancing existing explanations based on the 
resource-scarcity and agency theories. 
Research on franchising suggests that exact replications and standardization may enhance 
firm competitiveness.  Franchising systems are inherently more rigid (the franchise-agility 
paradox), hence there is less of an ability to quickly adapt the business model.  But the ability to 
shift resources among alternative uses of capital does exist among franchising systems.  Hybrid 
franchising organizations make up in resource fluidity what they may lose in strategic sensitivity. 
Some forward-thinking franchisors develop franchisee advisory councils in order to sensitize 
themselves to the needs of both franchisees and final consumers as well as to the environmental 
changes that affect their business.   
Our empirical test supports our claim that franchising firms use a hybrid growth strategy 
to achieve strategic agility. In the context of franchising, agility is a flexible response to changes 
in the business environment. In addition to flexibility, the hybrid growth strategy of franchising 
enables firms to rapidly match company strategy to the changing environment.  In essence, 
franchising firms are able to achieve resource fluidity, one of the key meta-capabilities of 
strategic agility (Doz and Kosonen, 2008a). 
This study can inform firm executives about the need to develop an ability to switch or to 
combine business models. In our case, two fairly rigid business models (growth via franchising 
and growth via company-owned units) are substituted or used jointly in order to remain flexible. 
Indeed, the flexibility of franchisors to adjust the proportion of their franchised units is one of the 
keys to their achieving strategic agility. In other words, the rigidity of a given business model 
should not impede a firm’s quest to apply resource fluidity. An inability to substitute or to 
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combine rigid business models is one of the main dangers leading to business failure in the 
present economic environment.  
Agility theory shows that franchising firms are networks of firms that have capabilities to 
switch between or to combine franchised and company units under various economic conditions. 
There is much to be said about adaptations and innovations within a given business model. 
Although franchising is particularly common in the service sector, franchisors can still engage in 
innovation by developing new products and services and by maintaining on-going dialogues with 
their franchisees and employee-managers. During the past two decades, franchisors have 
succeeded in updating their business models on both fronts. Some franchisors have used a 
number of variations of franchising, such as master franchising in international franchising, area 
development agreements, and multi-outlet franchising across markets. Other franchisors, such as 
OSI Capital Partners (also known as Outback Steakhouse), have implemented management 
compensation plans for their employee-managers. Yet another method is to implement a 
company-owned outlet strategy, often referred to as refranchising, whereby existing franchisee 
operations are re-acquired so as to increase profits.   
We recommend that executives of present and future franchising firms re-evaluate the 
viability of their business models and remain creative and flexible as economic conditions 
change. Imitating the business models of successful franchising firms may also be a useful 
recourse.  In particular, replication and rapid shifts from company-owned units to growth 
through franchising may be quite useful for franchising firms.  
Existing research shows that growth through franchising has a non-linear effect on firm 
performance (Combs et al., 2004). Even though some firms will grow through franchising, the 
financial performance of other firms may be hurt by franchising. Strategic agility emerges as one 
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of the key explanations for this conundrum. Indeed, firms that use franchising as a growth 
vehicle during periods of positive economic growth may be better off if they open company-
owned stores to realize their profit potential. Even though the average proportion of franchised 
units increased from 73 percent in 1980 to 81 percent in 1999, interviews with executives reveal 
that franchisors often seek a balance between the two business models and some franchisors may 
franchise their units whereas others will not (Combs et al., 2009). This offers some support for 
why firms may prefer to reconfigure their capabilities by opening company-owned units instead 
of growing solely via franchising. 
 The paradox of agility strategy is that efficient companies use business models that stress 
increasing stability (Doz and Kosonen, 2010), resulting in rigidity rather than agility (Doz and 
Kosonen, 2010).  We argue that a business growth strategy should not limit the expansion of 
units to a specific type of ownership.  Instead, such firms should adopt an agile strategy that is 
able to shift from company-owned units to franchised units and vice versa based on the business 
cycle, thereby partially solving the agility paradox.  A business plan may be rigid and stable 
because it shapes and frames the goals of the current growth strategy. At the same time, a 
business plan may include environmental markers that will signal a shift from focusing on 
company-owned units to franchising-based growth. This hybrid, agile franchising growth 
strategy can be implemented in growing companies to avoid slow and rigid responses to the 
environment, while, at the same time, maintaining a stable and efficient business strategy.  
The hybrid, agile franchising growth strategy that we describe in this article encompasses 
resource fluidity and also offers indirect support for strategic sensitivity and leadership unity. 
That is, franchising firms rely on strategic sensitivity to examine developments and changes in 
the economic environment. A shift from new company-owned units to franchisor-owned units is 
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based, in part, on changes in the external economic conditions. Successful implementation 
requires ongoing monitoring of the economic environment and business cycles so that the 
company can be proactive in making changes in response to the growth cycle. Due to the need of 
hybrid firms, such as franchising firms, to redeploy resources and reconfigure capabilities, they 
must exhibit leadership unity. That is, leadership unity is a key prerequisite for a hybrid, agile 
franchising growth strategy that can rapidly redeploy resources from internal-capital growth to 
external-capital growth. Leadership unity in the hybrid, agile franchising growth strategy 
requires a clear set of criteria in the business plan that will determine the shift from company-
owned outlet dominance to franchisor-owned outlet dominance and vice versa. The criteria 
should be based on solid environmental conditions, such as GDP growth, the liquidity of debt 
markets, unemployment rates, and so on. This will allow management to make rapid decisions.  
 
6 Limitations and future research 
Our study is not free of limitations which we acknowledge.  Our data does not encompass 
the number of company-owned outlets a firm is expected to open. Therefore, we are not fully 
able to directly assess the shifting strategies that firms apply. However, the use of exemplar firms 
offers some assurance that franchising firms are watching the state of the economy when they 
decided whether to open their own outlets or franchise them. 
Our findings on the impact of the business cycle on the use of franchising refer to U.S., or 
developed, market contexts. But franchising in the emerging markets is growing rapidly. Given 
that the emerging-market economies embody different institutional environments (Hoskisson et 
al., 2013), it is not clear that our results can be generalized to other contexts.  For example, 
franchising development in China has stalled not because of a recessionary environment, but 
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because of legal, political, and cultural constraints.  As such, many franchise companies in 
China, such as Yum! Brands and McDonald’s, have chosen to own most of their units so they 
can maintain control over quality, production, and expansion (Alon, 2010).  Future research on 
franchising should explore how the agility meta-capabilities are impacted by the institutional 
environment and, more specifically, how the business cycle may affect franchising in the 
developing world.  Another fruitful area for future research is to examine how the three meta-
capabilities of agility theory interact with one another.  We believe that resource fluidity is a 
resultant meta-capability that requires both leadership unity and strategic sensitivity, but we 
cannot verify this empirically.  Last, we acknowledge the limitation that we do not directly 
control for switching costs which makes our findings more conservative.  
A hybrid organization refers to an organization that consists of two co-existing logics, for 
both franchising and company ownership.  It is difficult to apply agility theory to those firms that 
use only one type of expansion.  Some franchisors only use franchising for expansion, whereas 
others, for example, retailers, may not use franchising at all.  Subway is mostly franchise-based, 
whereas Darden is mostly company-owned.  Given that these companies do not employ resource 
fluidity in ownership, they will have to use other meta-capabilities, i.e., leadership unity or 
strategic agility, to achieve agility.  Our article, which focuses on hybrid organizations that use 
both franchising and company ownership, provides an opportunity to test the resource fluidity of 
agility. Future studies may focus on how non-hybrid organizations use the other meta-
capabilities to achieve agility.   Future studies may also explore those contingencies that enable 
firms that franchise all of their units achieve long-term growth and, if possible, to juxtapose the 
financial performance of purely franchising firms (100 percent of franchised units) with hybrid 
franchising networks. 
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Table 1 Summary of established and emerging theories in franchising. 
 
Theory Key Assumptions Key Predictions 
Resource- 
Scarcity 
Theory 
Firms seek to reach a minimum 
efficient scale 
Unit ownership is more profitable 
than franchising 
Capital and managerial resources 
(e.g., skills or talent) are easier to 
acquire via franchising 
Young firms will franchise heavily during 
their early years 
Franchising will enhance the probability of 
survival 
Mature firms will later repurchase franchised 
units; the firms will ultimately be full-owned 
Agency Theory The  involved parties are self-
interested and rational 
Employee managers will exhibit 
shirking behavior 
Franchisees can potentially free ride 
on the brand name  
Vertical agency is more costly 
Franchisees will be motivated as residual 
claimants on profits 
Firms that franchise efficiently will perform 
better  
Firms will franchise units that are difficult to 
monitor and where the probability of free 
riding is low 
Search-Cost 
Theory 
Franchisees provide valuable 
information about  local markets 
Newer franchisors will franchise less if they 
can acquire market information from older 
franchisors  
 
There will be franchising in unfamiliar places, 
whereas companies will be owned in familiar 
locations 
 
Franchising cannot be predicted based on the 
economic conditions 
 
Signaling 
Theory 
Information is asymmetric between 
the franchisors and  the franchisees 
Franchisors need to signal the quality 
of their units to potential franchisees  
Firms will  use company-owned units to 
signal the quality of units to potential 
franchisors 
Firms will use company ownership minimally 
only to signal quality/proof of the concept 
Institutional 
Theory 
Common institutional, or industrial, 
environments influence franchisor  
decisions 
Mimetic and normative pressures will 
influence the proportion of franchised units 
Firms will use franchising to imitate other 
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industry players 
No prediction about franchising based on 
economic conditions 
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Table 2  Dependent, independent, and control variable measures. 
 
Variable Description Source 
Number of projected 
franchised units 
(PROJUNITS) 
Number of projected franchised units to be 
opened in the United States 
Bond’s Guide 
Gross Domestic 
Production (GDP) 
growth 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market 
prices based on constant local currency 
WDI 
GDP per capita 
growth 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita 
based on constant local currency. GDP per capita 
is gross domestic product divided by mid-year 
population. 
WDI 
Gross National 
Income  (GNI) 
growth 
Sum of value-added by all resident producers, 
plus any product taxes (less subsidies) plus net 
receipts of primary income from abroad 
WDI 
GNI per capita 
growth 
Annual percentage growth rate of GNI per capita WDI 
Unemployment 
growth 
Annual percentage growth of unemployment WDI 
Year founded 
(FOUNDED) 
Mature companies have developed better 
business routines and resources that allow for 
expansion.  Moreover, franchising firms tend 
to utilize franchising more extensively over 
time 
Bond’s Guide  
Franchised units 
(FRANUNITS) 
The number of existing franchised units of 
the company, thus capturing the company’s 
preferences 
 
Bond’s Guide  
Number of states 
(STATES) 
The number of U.S. states where the 
company has existing units. This measure 
captures the growth potential 
Bond’s Guide  
Average outlet 
startup cost 
(STARTUP) 
The size of investment per unit should 
negatively impact the number of franchised 
units to be opened in the near future 
Bond’s Guide 
Note: WDI= World Development Indicators
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
Notes: PROJUNITS=Number of projected franchised units, FOUNDED=Year founded, FRANUNITS= Number of franchised units, STATES= Number of U.S. 
States, STARTUP= Average unit startup cost outlet, GDP=GDP-Growth; GNI= GNI-Growth, GNIPC=GNIPC-Growth, UNEMPL- Unemployment; * p<0.05; 
Variable Mean S.D. X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6  X7 X8 X9      X10 X11              X12 X13 X14 X15 
X1.PROJUNITS 
 
67.05 175.18                             
X2.FOUNDED 
 
1974.99 17.44      
 
        1 
 
             
X3. FRANUNITS 
 
611.44 1242.52     -.29* 
 
     1             
X4.STATES 30.63 15.11  
 
  -.28 
 
.39*      1            
X5.STARTUP 
 
138.74 758.18     ..03 
 
-.03 .01     1           
X6.GDP 
 
2.09  1.07  
 
 -.00 
 
-.00 
 
.02 -.01 
 
    1          
X7.GDP2 
 
5.49       4.00     .00 
 
.00 
 
.02 -.00 
 
.95* 
 
   1        
X8.GDDPC 
 
1.12 1.07      .00   .00 .01 -.01 1.00*  .96* 
 
1       
X9. GDDPC2 
 
2.44 2.18     
 
    .00 
 
.00 
 
.02 -.00 
 
  .83* 
 
 .96* 
 
.84* 
 
   1      
X10.GNI 
 
2.34 1.02      .00 
 
  .00 
 
.02 
 
  -.00 
 
.67*  .53* 
 
.66** 
 
.35*    1     
X11.GNI2 
 
6.51 4.64      .00 
  
 .00 
 
.02 
 
.00 
 
 .51* 
 
 .40* 
 
.50* .25* 
 
.97* 
 
  1    
X12.GNIPC 
 
1.37 1.02      -.00 
 
  .00 
 
.02 
 
-.00 
 
.68*    .55* 
 
.68* .37* 
 
1.00* 
 
.96* 
 
   1   
X13.GNIPC2 
 
2.92      2.68     -.00 
 
.01 
 
.02 .00 
 
.40*  .32* 
 
.40* 
 
.21* 
 
.92* .99* 
 
.91* 
 
  1  
X14.UNEMPL 
 
         5.27 0.53     .00 
 
-.00 
 
-.02 
 
-.02 
 
-.10*  .01 
 
-.07* 
 
.13* 
 
-11* 
 
-.13* -.08* 
 
-.10* 
 
1 
X15.UNEMPL2         28.02 5.62      .00 
 
-.00 -.02 -.02 -11*  -.00 -.07* .13* -11* -.13* -.08* -.10* 1.00* 
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Table 4 Economic conditions and franchising. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Projected new franchised units 
FOUNDED -0.0225*** -0.0225*** -0.0227*** -0.0227*** -0.0225*** 
 (0.00437) (0.00437) (0.00437) (0.00437) (0.00439) 
SIZE 0.0018 0.0036 0.0016 0.0012 0.0071 
 (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0048) 
STATES    0.0095*** 0.0095*** 0.0098*** 0.0098*** 0.0091*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
STARTUP -0.001 -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0042 -0.0029 
 (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) 
GDP-Growth  -0.0705***     
 (0.0110)     
GDP-Growth2 0.0201***     
 (0.00293)     
GDPPC-Growth   -0.0317***    
  (0.00610)    
GDPPC-Growth2  0.0199***    
  (0.00302)    
GNI-Growth   -0.0510***   
   (0.0143)   
GNI-Growth2   0.0107***   
   (0.0031)   
GNIPC-Growth    -0.0287***  
    (0.00896)  
GNIPC-Growth2    0.0106***  
    (0.0034)  
Unemployment     0.407* 
     (0.2400) 
Unemployment2     -0.0362* 
     (0.0228) 
      
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
Number of companies 139 139 139 139 139 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The number of companies was reduced from 151 to 139 in the 
regressions due to unanswered questions (control variables) in the survey.    
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 Figure 1  Percentage change in expected new franchised units 
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